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Abstract  
This article explores the impact of corruption on farm level efficiency in two different 
rice cropping seasons in Bangladesh. The two different cropping seasons have different 
production and marketing conditions such that cost of corruption can be hypothesized  
being positively correlated with technical efficiency in one season while negatively in the 
other.  A  total  of  210  rice  farmer’s  data  were  analyzed  through  a  stochastic  frontier 
efficiency model. The results actually suggest that corruption costs might be efficiency 
enhancing or reducing, depending on the specific situation and context. If input markets 
are  sufficiently well  working,  and  farmers face  liquidity  constraints,  corruption costs 
reduce  efficiency.  Under  such  settings,  farmers  have  to  bear  extra  cost  imposed  by 
corruption,  and  hence  cannot  purchase  their  required  quantity  of  inputs.  But,  when 
famer’s capital requirement is relatively less, and input markets are highly restricted; 
bribe helps to access to market. The bribe paying farmers can acquire more inputs, and 
hence will operate at higher level of efficiency. This finding underlines the advantages of 




In  the  last  decades  agricultural  economists  learned  much  about  productivity  and 
efficiency  of  smallholder  farmers  in  developing  countries.  Impacts  of  different 
technologies,  the  influence  of  farmers’  personal  characteristics  or  the  relevance  of 
functioning  credit  and  land  markets  are  well  documented.  Also  the  impact  of  policy 
variables  such  as  subsidies,  export  tax,  infrastructure,  extension  service,  land 
redistribution and others are empirically analysed. However, governance aspects, such as 
corruption, which cannot be neglected in development strategies for smallholder farmers, 
are not analysed in the literature yet.  
The impact of corruption on farm productivity is particularly relevant for a country such 
as Bangladesh, which is ranked 134 in the well-known Corruption Perceptions Index 
(Transparency  International,  2010).  In  Bangladesh,  farmers  experience  corruption 
particularly on the fertilizer market, the seed market, in the subsidised use of irrigation 
pumps, and within the extension service. Government pays subsidy on fertilizers prices, 
to ease fertilizer purchase for resource poor farmers. But these subsidies fail to reach their 
target beneficiary, as the wholesalers grab the benefits (Ministry of Agriculture, 2006). 
Islam (2004) found that a small amount of quality seed remains available in Bangladesh, 
but their distribution system to the end users was faulty, irregular and inefficient mainly 
because  of  high  price  of  seeds,  lack  of  proper  monitoring  and  involvement  of  some 
corrupt  dealers  in  the  seed  distribution  system.  Besides,  irregularities,  favoritism  and 
nepotism  seriously  exist  in  extension  services,  and  few  farmers  get  benefit  of  these 
services (Ministry of Agriculture, 2006).  
To our knowledge there is not any empirical study about corruption impacts on farm 
productivity and hence efficiency.  We, thus, draw on studies from other sectors  as a starting point. Fisman & Svensson (2007) estimated that cost of corruption reduces firm 
growth  three  times  higher  more  than  an  equivalent  tax.  According  to  Mauro  (1995), 
corruption cuts down investment, and hence capital accumulation might be at lower level. 
He estimated that by improving the integrity and efficiency of bureaucracy to the level of 
Uruguay, Bangladesh could have increased its investment rate by almost 5 per cent points 
and yearly GDP growth rate by over 0.5 per cent point.  
Alternative roles of corruption are theoretically derived in literatures. Corruption greases 
the  wheels  where  bureaucracy  is  sluggish  and  ineffective  (Huntington,  1968).  To 
dishonest bureaucrats and  government officials, bribe is an incentive  for faster  work. 
Corruption is thought to be a second best option for efficiency and growth in developing 
countries,  where  the  regulations  are  ‘pervasive  and  cumbersome’  (Leff,  1964; 
Huntington, 1968; Bardhan, 1997). Bribe can work as ‘speed money’ and can enhance 
technology transfer (Méon & Weill, 2005). According to Lui (1985) bribe may reduce 
inefficiencies caused by public administration by reducing waiting costs. He believed that 
a system built on bribery will lead to an efficient process for allocating licenses and 
government contracts, since the most efficient firms can afford the highest bribes.  
The above literature implies that depending on the research perspective and the specific 
case, corruption may have different impacts in a specific situation. Thus, a reasonable 
development strategy for a specific region and economic sector cannot be formulated 
without understanding the corruption in that case. Moreover, no literature is available 
about impact of corruption on farm efficiency.  
We contribute to the empirical literature by analysing data from a natural experiment in 
Bangladesh. The impact of farm-level corruption costs on farms’ technical efficiency is 
analysed based on a sample of 210 farm households. For two consecutive rice growing 
seasons with different production and market conditions, we hypothesize an efficiency 
increasing  impact of  corruption  costs  in  the first season,  while  we  expect decreasing 
technical efficiency with higher corruption costs in the second season. We proceed with 
some background on rice production and related corruption in Bangladesh. Then, the 
research hypotheses are derived. The empirical model and the data are presented before 
results, and conclusions finish the paper. 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
There are three specific rice growing seasons in Bangladesh: Aus, Aman and Boro. As 
among these three seasons, Aman and Boro are dominant in terms of production and area 
cultivated. Aman is grown during the rainy season and natural rainfall is likely to be 
sufficient for the traditional rice varieties used. Farmers need to irrigate only when there 
is inadequate or irregular rainfall. On the other hand, Boro rice is cultivated during the 
winter, and more HYV seeds are used. Consequently, the (marginal) productivity of both 
irrigation and fertilizer in rice cultivation is much higher in Boro season compared to 
Aman season.  
Rice farmers in Bangladesh face different kinds of corruption. For example, irrigating is 
subsidized for farmers. A certain portion of the electricity bill for operating irrigation 
equipments is refunded to the farmers. But in reality, while receiving the subsidy in form 
of  refunded  electricity  bill,  farmers have  to  pay  bribe  to  ‘motivate’the  administrative 
persons working properly. Furthermore, different mineral fertilizers are subsidized and 
the  market  is  highly  regulated  including  government  fixed  prices  and  assignment  of dealers  and  retailers.  In  addition,  in  the  Aman  season,  farmers  had  to  get  slip  from 
extension agents to collect fertilizers from the retailers. Collecting slip in many cases was 
not possible without paying bribe. Consequently, the market was far from competitive 
and subsidies were likely to be extracted to some extent by the dealers, retailers and 
extension agents as well as water pump owners. 
How do these corruption phenomena influence technical efficiency of rice production? 
For our intuitive explanation we, first, account for the following deviation from common 
production  theory:  perfect  adjustment  of  inputs  is impossible  in  rice  production  after 
seeding  when  e.g.  fertilizer  availability  –  without  paying  bribe  –  turns  out  to  be 
insufficient several weeks after seeding. Now imagine two identical farmers who choose 
the  same  input  bundle  in  a  corruption-free  world.  Then  (imperfectly  anticipated) 
corruption comes into play and a farmer who is not willing or not able to pay bribe 
cannot realize his optimal input bundle (taking into account marginal costs of corruption 
for some inputs). Consequently, he will be less technically efficient than the bribe paying 
farmer. 
We now differentiate between a situation with several capital-constrained farmers (e.g. 
due to high input prices) and a situation without capital constraints. Even in a corruption-
free  world  a  capital-constraint  farmer’s  input  bundle  will  deviate  more  or  less  from 
optimal. Additional costs such as bribe will further reduce the overall productivity of his 
input bundle. Consequently, for highly capital-constrained farmers one can expect that 
higher bribe payments reduce efficiency. If – in contrast – most of the sample farmers are 
not capital-constrained high corruption costs maybe an indicator for being more efficient 
than other farmers, e.g. because the realized input bundle is closer to optimal than other 
farmers’ bundles, the received input quality is higher than other farmers’ input quality, or 
the  farmer  is  simpler  smarter  in  ‘greasing the  wheels’  and therefore  he  may  be also 
smarter  in  other  management  activities.  Such  high  corruption  costs  are  particularly 
necessary when market aggregated supply is limited.     
Consequently, we expect a technical efficiency increasing effect of corruption costs if 
capital-constraints are not much relevant in the sample but input markets are quantity 
restricted.  In  contrast  we  expect  that  corruption  costs  decrease technical efficiency  if 
many farmers in the sample are capital-constrained and input markets are not quantity 
restricted for the well capital-endowed farmers. 
How can we test these hypotheses? We have a unique dataset which offers a natural 
experiment with the same farmers in two different production seasons. Aman season is 
characterized by less intensive production and, thus, be lower capital requirements. In 
addition  in  2008  season  farmers  faced  a  specific  ‘corruption  environment’  in  Aman 
season which led to quantity restricted fertilizer markets. In the subsequent Boro season 
fertilizer  markets  had  not  been  restricted  in  their  aggregate  quantities  anymore  since 
marketing channels had been changed by the government, but many farmers had been 
capital-constrained since capital requirements are higher in this production season with 
high costs for irrigation and HYV seeds. Consequently, for Aman season we hypothesize 
that cost of corruption increase a farmer’s technical efficiency while corruption costs are 
expected  to  reduce  technical  efficiency  in  Boro  season.  We  now  explain  that  the 
production and market conditions in both the seasons actually led to natural experiment 
we set out above.     In the Aman season, fertilizer dealers were assigned at union level (administrative unit 
over village level), and each dealer was allowed to appoint two representatives to sell 
fertilizers  in  the  respective  union’s  villages.  As  dealers  had  freedom  to  select 
representatives, in many cases they selected their relatives or friends, who had no or little 
experience in fertilizer marketing. Considering number of villages and farm households, 
two representatives for one union is hardly sufficient. Farmers also had very little idea 
and information about assigned representatives for their union. Furthermore, farmers had 
to get slip from extension agents to collect fertilizers. In the slip the maximum quantity of 
fertilizer that a farmer was allowed to purchase was mentioned. Many farmers reported 
not to have desirable quantity mentioned on the slip. Collecting appropriate slip in many 
cases  was  only  possible  with  paying  bribe.  In  addition, high world-market  prices  for 
fertilizer reduced imports. Consequently, 27.7% of our farmers reported to have been 
input  restricted  in  Aman  season  though  having  enough  money  to  buy  more  fertilizer 
(Table 1). Only 1% of the farmers reported that they had been capital-constrained.   
For the following Boro season, the government modified the fertilizer marketing channel. 
Dealers  were  appointed  at  district  level,  and  depending  on  the  size  of  the  union, 
maximum nine retailers were appointed for each union. The slip system was abolished. 
Moreover, imports had been easier in Boro season since world-market prices declined. 
Consequently, only 5.4% of the farmers reported to have been input restricted though 
having enough money to buy more inputs (Table 1). As explained above farmers have to 
bear  costs  for irrigation,  HYV  seeds,  and  30%  more fertilizer  use  (Table  1)  in Boro 
season.  Consequently,  19  of  the  210  farmers  reported  that  they  had  been  capital-
constrained in Boro season. 
Summarizing, rice production in 2008-09, Aman and Boro season actually constitutes a 
natural experiment for analyzing the impact of corruption on technical efficiency.  
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA  
The hypotheses are tested by means of a stochastic production frontier model. Such a 
model allows for estimating farmers’ technical efficiency in rice production as well as 
estimating determinants for different efficiency levels. Among the determinants we test 
for any significant impacts of cost of corruption on technical efficiency. Formally, the 
translog stochastic production frontier for the ith farm is defined as: 
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Where  the  dependent  variable  yi  is  the  quantity  of  total  paddy  production  (kg)  xji  is 
quantity of input j for farmer i, and Ddi is dummy m indicating shifting parameters in the 
production function; vi is the common i.i.d error term while ui is a one-sided half-normal 
error representing technical inefficiency.  
As production practices and technologies are different in Aman and Boro season, we 
estimate  separate  models  for  each  and  two  input  variables  differ.  The  input  factor 
variables for Aman season are: quantity of seed (kg), quantity of chemical fertilizers (kg), quantity  of  labour  (man-days),  cost  of  land  preparation  and  equipments  (BDT
1),  and 
quantity of land (hectare). The dummy variables for the same season are: organic manure 
(1  =  used),  irrigation  (1  =  irrigated),  and  pesticides  (1  =  used).  For  Boro  season, 
measurement of the variables is identical to Aman season except for seed and irrigation. 
For seed costs are used instead of quantity to capture the quality differences of seeds due 
to widespread use of HYV seeds. In addition, a dummy variable reflects HYV of a farmer 
in Boro season. Irrigation is indicated by a dummy in Aman season since natural rainfall 
is sufficient in general. Only one fourth of the farmers irrigate. On the other hand, Boro 
rice is cultivated during the dry season. Moreover, due to widespread use of HYV seeds, 
water requirement in Boro season is high. We, thus, decided to use cost of irrigation to 
reflect farmers’ input choice on irrigation in Boro season.  
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Here, the socio-economic characteristics of the farm to explain inefficiency are presented 
by zi. These variables are: dummy of extension service received (1=received); household 
head’s years of experience in rice farming; dummy for infrastructure (1=improved peri-
urban infrastructure, 0=less developed rural infrastructure); education of household head 
(0=Illiterate, 1=Primary education, 2=Secondary, 3=Higher secondary, 4= Above higher 
secondary) off farm income share (share of off farm income to household’s total income) 
own land share (share of own land to total land under rice cultivation); dummy for input 
restricted farmer (1=input restricted farmers, i.e. farmers who failed to collect required 
quantity of inputs due to unavailability in the market though having enough money to pay 
bribe  or  to  buy  more  inputs),  and  cost  of  corruption  for  availing  inputs  and  getting 
services  (BDT);  and  ωi  is  random  error,  which  is  assumed  to  follow  a  positive  half 
normal distribution.  
Technical efficiency (TEi) of the ith farm is the ratio of the observed output for the ith 
farm, relative to the potential output defined by the frontier function, where the input 






















The technical efficiency of a farmer is between zero and one. The maximum-likelihood 
estimates for all parameter of the stochastic frontier and inefficiency model, is obtained 
by using the computer program STATA 10. 
Survey and Data 
The survey data are collected through a multi-stage random sampling, 210 rice growers 
belonging to six villages of six different districts of Bangladesh had been interviewed. 
                                                 
1 Exchange rate: 1 Euro = 97.5 BDT.  The districts had above-median rice production in 2008/09. Thus we have 32 districts 
selected. From these districts the top three and bottom three districts had been chosen 
according to  the  proportion  of  households experienced corruption  in  service  sectors.
2 
From each district the sub-districts with highest rice production had been chosen and 
among the sub-districts the villages with highest rice production. In the final stage, 35 
farm households from each village were selected randomly from list of farmers available 
with the local office of Department of Agricultural Extension. Despite the variables used 
in the analysis at hand data had been collected about agricultural production in general, 
household characteristics, nutritional status, and corruption experience. 
Table 1: Summary statistics of the variables used in the stochastic frontier model  
Variables  Aman  Boro 
Variables in the production function     
Quantity of paddy produced (kg/farm)  2449.6  4079.6 
Quantity of seed (kg/farm)  33.2   
Cost of seed (BDT/farm)    1177.2 
Quantity of fertilizer (kg/farm)  183.1  237.9 
Quantity of labour (man-days/farm)  70.5  77.3 
Quantity of land (hectare/farm)  0.7  0.6 
Cost of land preparation & equipments (BDT/farm)  3307.3  4958.2 
Cost of irrigation (BDT/farm)    5573.5 
% of farmers implying irrigation  26.4   
% of farmers implying organic manure  7.2  8.0 
% of farmers using HYV seeds    20.3 
Variables used in the inefficiency model     
% of farmers received extension services  41.6  44.4 
Household head’s year of experiences   22.1  22.0 
Mean of share of off farm income to total income   0.3  0.3 
Mean of share of own land to total land   0.8  0.8 
Cost of corruption (BDT)  1843.2  983.4 
% of farmers being input restricted   27.7  5.4 
Infrastructure  Peri-urban   34.2  36.9 
  Rural  65.8  63.1 
Education  Illiterate  43.1  42.3 
  Primary   10.9  11.2 
  Secondary  36.6  38.0 
  Higher secondary  6.4  5.4 
  Above higher secondary  3.0  3.2 
Source: Field survey 2009. 
The  summary  statistics  of  the  variables  used  in  the  model  are  presented  in  Table  1. 
Farmers use around one half hectare for rice cultivation, around 70 to 80 man-days are 
needed  for  one  growing  period  on  a  farm.  In  general,  per-farm  production  and 
requirement of inputs is higher in Boro season than in Aman season. The only exception 
is with quantity of land cultivated. Probably, irrigation requirement limited availability of 
appropriate rice land in Boro season. Due to irrigation and HYV seed, costs in Boro 
                                                 
2 The proportion was estimated from the database of ‘National Household Survey 2007 on Corruption in 
Bangladesh’. The survey was conducted by Transparency International Bangladesh. The survey covered 62 
districts of the country. The two districts not covered by the survey, did not appear in our first ranking. season sum up to 61,674 BDT/hectare, including e.g. hired labour, fertilizer, land rent. 
This is substantially higher than in Aman season with roughly 35,798 BDT/hectare. 
The  summary  statistics  of  the  variables  used  in  the  technical  inefficiency  model  are 
presented in the lower portion of Table 1. Majority of farmers in both seasons do not 
receive  any  services  from  the  government  extension  office.  Agriculture  is  the  major 
source of farm household’s income in both the seasons. Around two-third of household’s 
income is coming from different agricultural activities. Farm households mostly cultivate 
own  land.  Rented  in  land  contributes  less  than  one-third  of  the  total  land  under  rice 
production. All the variables except cost of corruption and the number of input restricted 
do not vary much between the two seasons. Compared to Boro season, cost of corruption 
in Aman season is almost double. Proportion of farmers being input restricted is more 
than five times higher in Aman season than Boro season. Restricted fertilizer marketing 
channel and unexpected higher fertilizer price in Aman season, created uncertainty and 
volatility in the input market. Corrupt dealers utilized these market situations and created 
artificial crisis. Ultimately higher proportion of farmers became input restricted, and had 
to bear higher cost of corruption. 
The following three components are incorporated in the cost of corruption: 
i) Excess payment in the input market (BDT): Excess payment in the input market is the 
difference  between  government  fixed  retailer  price  and  the  actual  price  paid  by  the 
farmers.  Only  the  subsidized  inputs  are  considered  here.  In  addition,  bribe  paid  by 
irrigation pump owners to collect irrigation subsidy, is also included.  
ii) Monetary value of time wasted and excess transportation cost (BDT): A farmer may 
experience  time  wastage  due  to  repeated  visits  to  dealers  and  for  waiting  in  queue. 
Moreover, a farmer may have to bear excess transportation cost for repeated visits, and 
separate transportation of small quantities instead of a common large one. These two cost 
components  are  incorporated  in  cost  of  corruption  only  when  there  was  no  supply 
shortage; and if farmers had enough capital, and willingness to purchase input. To ensure 
that there was no supply shortage, secondary data about fertilizer and seed supply in the 
local market was checked. Time wasted is measured in man-days and then multiplied 
with the wage rate. Here we have used farm specific wage rate that were available at the 
time of collecting that specific input. Excess transportation cost includes cost of vehicles, 
which was obtained in the questionnaire.  
iii)  Cost  of  corruption  in  government  extension  services  (BDT):  Some  of  the 
demonstration plot organizers reported not to receive proper quantity of inputs from the 
extension  office  while  organizing  demonstration  plots.  The  monetary  value  of  these 
inputs that the extension office was supposed to but did not supply, constitute the final 
part of cost of corruption. 
RESULTS 
The  results  are  organised  in  three  subsections.  First,  we  test  whether  the  model 
specification is appropriate, followed by results on the production frontier function before 
the determinants of inefficiency – including costs of corruption are reported.  
Specification tests 
Specification tests show that the model specification outlined above is appropriate for our 
data.  First,  the  translog  specification  is  to  be  preferred  over  Cobb-Douglas  in  both seasons (Table 2). Furthermore, there are inefficiency effects in the model. The variance-
ratio parameter 
* γ  implies that 91.4 per cent of the differences between observed and the 
maximum frontier production for Aman rice farming is due to differences in efficiency 
levels among farmers. This difference is 82.6 per cent in Boro season (Table 4).  
 Table 2: Specification Tests  
Null Hypothesis  Aman  Boro 
Functional form test: Cobb Douglas versus translog model( ) 0 : 0 = jk H β  
Likelihood test statistics ( )
2 χ   87.59***  52.58*** 
No inefficiency effects ( ) 0 .......... : 8 1 0 0 = = = = δ δ δ H  
Likelihood test statistics ( )
2 χ   36.88***  25.17*** 
No inefficiency present in the model( ) 0 : 0 = =γ   H
a 
Likelihood test statistics ( )
2 χ   87.68***  133.80*** 
Note: 
a Since the test involves testing of γ  parameter, it has a mixed 
2 χ  distribution. The value of 
2 χ  is 
taken from Kodde & Palm (1986). *** indicate significance at 1% level. 
Source: Own estimation. 
We further found that monotonicity, i.e. positive marginal products for all inputs, and 
diminishing marginal productivities are fulfilled for all the inputs. By using the predictnl 
command in STATA 10, both these tests are conducted at the sample mean. 
Parameter Estimates of Stochastic Production Frontier 
The MLE estimates of the translog stochastic production frontier function are presented 
in Table 4. The estimated output elasticity of land is 0.702 and 0.826 in Aman and Boro 
season, respectively; implying that a 1 per cent increase in land area will result in 0.702 
and 0.826 per cent increase in rice production in Aman and Boro season, respectively. 
Asadullah  &  Rahman  (2009)  estimated  output  elasticity  of  land  for  Bangladeshi  rice 
producers, varies from 0.65 to 0.71. Using panel data across 23 major rice producing 
districts of Bangladesh over the period 1994-1999, Selim (2010) estimated land elasticity 
of output is almost near to one. High land elasticity for Bangladeshi rice growers is also 
estimated by Wadud & White (2000) and Rahman (2003). 
Table 4: MLE estimates of the translog stochastic production frontier function 
Aman  Boro 
Variables  Coeffi.  SE  Coeffi.  SE 
Constant  7.826***  0.011  8.287***  0.049 
Seed  0.097  0.059  0.012  0.026 
Fertilizer   0.035  0.031  0.119***  0.040 
Labour  0.136**  0.060  0.137***  0.059 
Land preparation & equipments  0.032  0.071  0.106  0.138 
Irrigation  -0.060  0.040  0.179***  0.068 
Land  0.702***  0.066  0.826***  0.085 
Seed 
2  0.064  0.143  -0.023  0.046 
Seed × Fertilizer  0.172**  0.076  0.022  0.093 
Seed × Labour  0.401**  0.172  0.106  0.086 
Seed × Land preparation & equipments  -0.132  0.087  -0.018  0.130 Aman  Boro 
Variables  Coeffi.  SE  Coeffi.  SE 
Seed × Land  -0.446***  0.217  -0.105  0.154 
Seed × Irrigation      0.032  0.106 
Fertilizer 
2  0.044  0.079  -0.469***  0.192 
Fertilizer × Labour  0.246*  0.133  -0.261***  0.101 
Fertilizer × Land preparation & equipments  -0.062  0.060  -0.833***  0.280 
Fertilizer × Land  -0.388*  0.199  0.471  0.304 
Fertilizer × Irrigation      0.697***  0.212 
Labour 
2  -2.019***  0.480  -0.698  0.475 
Labour × Land preparation & equipments  0.0002  0.145  -0.121  0.387 
Labour × Land  1.295***  0.462  0.525  0.458 
Labour × Irrigation      0.107  0.319 
Land preparation & equipments 
2  -0.074***  0.028  1.320  0.862 
Land preparation & equipments × Land  0.155  0.189  0.996**  0.450 
Land preparation & equipments × Irrigation      -1.565**  0.704 
Land 
2  -0.519*  0.312  -1.455***  0.546 
Land × Irrigation      -0.318  0.389 
Irrigation × Irrigation      1.168**  0.540 
Organic manure  0.155**  0.071  0.017  0.025 
HYV seed      0.062***  0.023 
Pesticides  0.002  0.029  -0.020  0.034 
Technical inefficiency model 
Constant  0.528***  0.117  0.142**  0.075 
Extension Service  -0.041  0.069  0.002  0.027 
Experience  -0.005*  0.003  0.001  0.001 
Peri-urban infrastructure  0.095  0.074  0.164***  0.043 
Education  -0.015  0.030  -0.002  0.012 
Own land share   -0.308***  0.091  -0.071*  0.043 
Off farm income share   0.068  0.052  0.038  0.025 
Cost of corruption (100 BDT)  -0. 01***  0.000  0.002**  0.000 
Input restricted farmers  0.095  0.073  0.012  0.059 
2 2 2
v u σ σ σ + =   0.082***  0.004  0.020***  0.004 
2 2 /σ σ γ u =   0.967***  0.040  0.929***  0.108 
* γ   0.914    0.826   
Log likelihood function   87.68    133.80   
Technical efficiency  78.6    80.5   
Number of observations  202    187   
Note:  * γ  is equal to  [ ] ) 2 /( ) 1 ( / − − + π π γ γ γ  (Coelli et al., 1998). *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Some variables are dropped due to high multicollinearity. 
All the resource input variables were mean-differenced ( ) k ik x x − prior to estimation.  
Source: Own estimation. 
The estimated elasticity of labour is almost equal and significantly positive in both the 
seasons. The estimated elasticities of labour indicate that, 1 per cent increase in quantity 
of labour used will result in 0.136 per cent and 0.137 per cent increase in Aman and Boro 
production, respectively. Irrigation and fertilizer also have significant impact on Boro 
rice production. One per cent increase in quantity of fertilizer and cost of irrigation will result in 0.119 per cent and 0.179 per cent increase in Boro rice production, respectively. 
Among the dummy variables organic manure in Aman season and HYV seed in Boro 
season  have  significant  impact  on  production  (Table  4).  The  sum  of  mean  output 
elasticities for all the inputs are 1.002 and 1.378 for Aman and Boro season respectively. 
Using translog production function for Aman rice growers in Bangladesh, Rahman & 
Rahman (2008) estimated increasing returns to scale, too.  
Technical efficiency in rice production  
The mean technical efficiency is estimated at 78.6 per cent and 80.5 per cent for Aman 
and Boro growers, respectively (Table 4). Coelli et al. (2002) and Balcombe et al. (2007) 
also estimated higher technical efficiency for the modern variety growers (Boro growers) 
over the traditional variety growers (Aman growers). The estimated efficiency scores are 
in line with Wadud & White (2000); Rahman (2003); Asadullah & Rahman, (2009); and 
Selim  (2010).  Farmers  exhibit  a  wide  range  of  variation  in  technical  efficiency, 
particularly in Aman season. In Aman season farmer’s efficiency ranges from 0.280 to 
0.999;  whereas  the  range  is  0.540  to  0.985  in  Boro  season.  Efficiency  is  more 
homogenous  in  Boro  season  since  irrigation  prevents  drought-caused  extreme  yield 
shortfalls.  
Turning  to  the  determinants  of  efficiency,  the  most  interesting findings are  the  signs 
associated with cost of corruption. In both the seasons, cost of corruption is significant, 
though  it  is  negative  in  Aman  and  positive  in  Boro  (Table  4).  Consequently,  the 
hypothesized  impacts  of  corruption  can  be  empirically  confirmed.  The  estimated 
elasticity  for  cost  of  corruption  imply  that,  1%  higher  cost  of  corruption  increase 
technical efficiency in Aman season by around 1.5%-point while it decreases technical 
efficiency in Boro season by around 0.5%-points (Table 5). 
Table 5: Elasticities of the efficiency variables 
Variables  Aman  Boro 
Experience  0.0063*  -0.0048 
Education  0.0015  0.0006 
Own land share   0.0217***  0.0127* 
Off farm income share   -0.0021  -0.0029 
Cost of corruption (100 BDT)  0.0145***  -0.0047** 
Note: Following Rahman & Rahman (2008), the elasticity of technical efficiency for farmer i with respect 
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and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
Due to space constraints we only turn to the impact of own land share and the peri-urban 
infrastructural dummy. Farmers with a higher own land share are more efficient as in 
Coelli et al. (2003) and Rahman (2003). This might be explained through relatively lower 
quality of land, which is generally rented out to the tenants. The peri-urban infrastructure 
indicates  that  farmers  with  peri-urban  infrastructure  have  relatively  lower  level  of 
technical efficiency than their counterparts who live in rural areas. This contradicts with 
earlier findings of Ali & Flinn (1989), Ahmed & Hossain (1990), Coelli et al. (2002) and 
Rahman (2003). Since none of our rural areas has typical remote settings, i.e. no access 
through road, non-availability of transportation vehicles etcwe do not expect substantial 
differences in cost, effort and time of marketing between peri-urban and rural areas.  CONCLUSIONS 
The impact of farm-level corruption costs on farms’ technical efficiency was analysed 
based  on  a  sample  of  210  Bangladeshi  rice  growing  farm  households.  For  two 
consecutive rice growing seasons with different production and market conditions, we 
hypothesized an efficiency increasing impact of corruption costs in the first – Aman – 
season while we expected decreasing technical efficiency with higher corruption costs in 
the second – Boro – season. This natural experiment is possible since in Aman season 
2008 the  fertilizer  market  which is highly regulated by the  government  was  quantity 
restricted for several reasons. Corruption allowed bribe payers to enter the input market 
and to acquire adequate fertilizer complementary to other inputs. Hence bribe payers are 
assumed to be more efficient. In contrast, fertilizer market was less restricted in Boro 
season but many farmers had been capital-constrained since production is more intensive 
in this season. In this case, additional corruption costs exacerbate the financing gap for 
some farmers and, thus, we expected that technical efficiency decreases with corruption 
costs in Boro season. 
Our stochastic production frontier analysis actually finds that the cost of corruption in 
both seasons impacts technical efficiency in rice production in different directions like we 
hypothesized.  
We conclude that bribe payments may be positive if they substitute (partially) for an 
insufficiently working price mechanism. This may happen on quantity-restricted input 
markets  where  prices  can  not  affect  the  quantities  traded.  Policy  interventions,  thus, 
should not restrict quantities, since either corruptions or rent seeking will be the outcome. 
If, however, prices allocate an input bribe payments (for other goods and service) may 
still indirectly reduce the productivity of capital-constrained farmers. Consequently, bad 
governance  can  have  severe  side-effects  on  production  of  capital-constrained 
smallholders irrespective which services are corrupt. 
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